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Abstract
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its sympathizers utilize social
media platforms to disseminate propaganda, radicalize audiences, and recruit foreign
fighters. Some Western social media users are susceptible to these efforts. Although
personal privacy and freedom of speech is largely protected by complex governmental
limitations, the social media use of extremists sparked a national debate on how to protect
American citizens. This thesis will discuss the history of ISIS and its social media use,
the terrorist group’s target audiences, ISIS recruitment strategies, and policy decisions
and options aimed at reducing the effectiveness of pro-jihadist propaganda. This paper
will explain what the United States can implement, already implemented, and could
implement in the future.
Keywords: ISIS, jihadist, social media, policy

Howell vi
Table of Contents
Title ..................................................................................................................................... i
Copyright ........................................................................................................................... ii
Dedication ......................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... iv
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. v
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. vi
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
Chapter 1: History of the Formation of the Islamic State .................................................. 3
Chapter 2: History of Online ISIS Propaganda, Radicalization, and Recruitment ............ 8
Chapter 3: Seeking a Target Audience ............................................................................ 13
Chapter 4: Radicalization and Recruitment Tactics ......................................................... 18
Chapter 5: Counterterrorism Efforts ................................................................................ 30
Chapter 6: Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 57
Works Cited ..................................................................................................................... 59

Howell 1
Introduction
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) radicalizes and recruits Americans
through social media and will likely continue its successful social media campaign over
the course of the next year since the Shiite governments in Iraq and Syria remain in
power. In order to comprehend the success of ISIS, one would benefit from
understanding how the organization formed, the evolution of its social media presence,
the target audience of the ISIS social media campaign, and the tactics utilized by ISIS
recruiters after Westerners have been radicalized.
Throughout this thesis, the term “radicalization” is within the context of Islamic
extremism. Within this context, the author of this thesis utilizes the definition of
radicalization from the New York Police Department report “Radicalization in the West:
The Homegrown Threat.” The article defines radicalization as “the progression of
searching, finding, adopting, nurturing, and developing this extreme belief system to the
point where it acts as a catalyst for a terrorist act” (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, p. 16). Since
radicalization can be described as a spectrum of progression, some individuals are more
radicalized than others. For that reason, some people may simply hold radical beliefs
while others act on said beliefs.
In order to describe current radicalization issues and public and private policy
decisions to confront terrorism, this thesis utilizes news outlet sources since academic
sources are often not as current. The author of this thesis utilized academic sources,
however, when researching information that did not change throughout the course of
researching for this thesis, such as the history of Islam and the Islamic State and the
target audience of the ISIS recruiters.
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This thesis examines the creation and goals of ISIS and its use of social media to
recruit followers. It also explores the public and private sector methods to combat such
efforts. Chapter 1 explains how a faction of al Qaeda evolved into a separate terrorist
group known as ISIS. In addition, it briefly describes the history of Islam and why ISIS
has gathered so many Sunni followers. Chapter 2 details how and why ISIS and other
terrorist groups began utilizing social media for radicalization and recruitment rather than
other forms of communication. It also explains how ISIS uses social media to disseminate
propaganda to wide audiences throughout the world. Chapter 3 details which people,
based on current information, are most susceptible to ISIS recruitment efforts. In Chapter
4, the study illustrates the detailed process ISIS recruiters use to radicalize people through
contact on social media. Additionally, the chapter describes the different approaches ISIS
uses from an al Qaeda recruitment manual to radicalize people of various backgrounds
and beliefs. Chapter 5 describes and analyzes numerous counterterrorism efforts, both
successful and unsuccessful, implemented by the public and private sector. The public
sector conducts counterterrorism projects, sting operations, and military strikes on ISIS
targets. Private sector companies remove ISIS-sympathetic profiles that break terms of
use agreements, reroute potential recruits to anti-jihadist propaganda, and report
legitimate threats to law enforcement officials, among other practices. Finally, Chapter 6
consists of recommendations to improve current counterterrorism efforts so that they will
be more successful in the future. This chapter also argues the overall success of the
counterterrorism policies implemented by private and public American groups since the
creation of ISIS.
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Chapter 1: History of the Formation of the Islamic State
When the United States government overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003, the
power vacuum allowed many terrorist groups to organize and take control. Many terrorist
organizations originally held political goals, but they began to gain support by shifting
their focus to religious tribalism. Much of the rise of ISIS stemmed from unrest between
Shiite governments and largely Sunni citizen populations. ISIS heavily focused on the
divisions between the Islamic sects in order to gain support from angry Sunnis. For that
reason, it is important to understand the two sects of Islam (Celso, 2015).
Sunnis and Shiites represent two major sects of Islam, and the schism between the
sects can be traced back to the succession of leadership in Islam after Muhammad.
Muhammad’s son-in-law, Ali, became the leader of Islam after his father-in-law’s death.
The term “Shi’at Ali,” which evolved into the word “Shiite,” means the “partisans of
Ali.” Originally, Muhammad’s followers did not allow Ali to succeed the leadership
position, but the Shi’at Ali argued that Muhammad named Ali and his family the leaders
of Islam. Eventually, Muhammad’s disciples agreed, and Ali became the Islamic leader
who later passed his leadership to his son Hussein. Shiites believe that the teachings of
Muhammad and twelve caliphs, comprised of some of Muhammad’s direct descendants
including Ali and Hussein, are the true authority of Islam. In the Shiite belief, only those
thirteen men are considered the mediators between God and the world (“The Unending
Feud,” 1987).
On the other hand, Sunnis honor Ali, but they do not consider him or the other
eleven caliphs as people who directly interacted with Allah in ways that other Muslims
cannot. Instead, Sunnis believe that anyone can have a direct relationship with Allah if
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the person follows the Quran. The word “sunna,” which is the root of the word “Sunni,”
means “the tradition of the Prophet,” which places emphasis on tradition rather than
heredity. Conflict has taken place between the two factions for generations. In fact, “in
the eyes of the Shi’ites, any regime not under the rule of the Prophet’s true heirs is an
abomination” (“The Unending Feud,” 1987). Shiite governments continue to hold this
stance, which continues strife in the Middle East such as the Sunni rebellions against the
Shiite Iraqi and Syrian forces.
By 2013, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) became ISIS, which operates mainly in Iraq and
Syria. AQI took advantage of the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of United States
military troops in Iraq to increase its power in the country against the Shiite prime
minister, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Many Middle Eastern Sunnis believe that
Al-Maliki repressed Sunni political opponents, and many local and foreign fighters joined
AQI in battle against the Shiite government of Iraq. Numerous fighters who battled in
Iraq later fought against the Shiite government of Syria in the Syrian civil war as well
since both governments allegedly mistreated Sunnis (Celso, 2015).
AQI utilized social media to recruit Sunnis from around the Middle East to join in
the fight against the Shiite governments of both Iraq and Syria. Recruitment efforts, both
online and offline, were so successful that more than ten thousand Sunni Muslims from
other countries (hereafter referred to as foreign Sunni fighters) joined the Syrian civil war
by the end of 2013 while thousands also fought in Iraq. Due to the resurgence of Sunni
power in the region, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of AQI, decided to rename his
faction of al Qaeda the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) in April 2013. Although
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the group was still a part of al Qaeda, al-Baghdadi believed that ISIS deserved individual
notoriety (Celso, 2015).
The name “Abu Bakr” resonates well with many Muslims since the first caliph
after Muhammad’s death was a man named Abu Bakr. Bakr was Muhammad’s father-inlaw and the first Muslim that was not a blood relative of Muhammad (“Abu Bakr”). Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi’s name could produce thoughts of the highly praised Muslim figure,
similarly to how Pope John XXIII had a name that reminded Christians of the apostle
John.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi followed in the footsteps of his Sunni predecessor in al
Qaeda leadership, a man named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed by an American
drone strike. During his time as an al Qaeda leader, al-Zarqawi declared that he
envisioned an eventual Sunni caliphate that was free of opposing religions and cultures.
Fellow al Qaeda members criticized both al-Zarqawi and his follower al-Baghdadi for
their unrealistic ideology of a Sunni caliphate. In February 2014, al Qaeda’s leadership
expelled ISIS from the rest of the terrorist group, which gave al-Baghdadi the freedom to
alter the goals of ISIS (Celso, 2015).
Several developments allowed al-Baghdadi to make al-Zarqawi’s dream a reality:
a weakened Iraqi government following the overthrow of dictator Saddam Hussein, the
ISIS success in Syria, and the Islamic State’s division from the rest of al Qaeda.
Eventually, ISIS controlled large swaths of land near the Iraqi-Syrian border due to the
size and force of the organization. In June 2014, al-Baghdadi issued a statement that ISIS
had become an independent Sunni caliphate. The caliphate grew throughout 2014 as ISIS
took control of more land throughout the Middle East (Celso, 2015).
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ISIS members’ faith in the guidance of al-Baghdadi as an official caliph led to
much of the success and growth of the jihadist group. Al-Baghdadi’s followers often refer
to him as Caliph Ibrahim, since Ibrahim is his birth name and the word “caliph” means
“successor” to the Prophet Muhammad (Wood, 2016, p. 16). According to Muslim
tradition, four “rightly guided caliphs” led Muslims after Muhammad died in 632 until
661 (Wood, 2016, p. 15). Since a true caliph is a successor of Muhammad, a caliph can
demand devotion from all Muslims, as al-Baghdadi does. A caliph, historically, must
adhere to specific requirements. In order to be a caliph, a person must be male, a devout
Muslim, adult, free of physical and mental handicaps of any kind, and come from the
Quarysh tribe in the Arabian Peninsula. The original “rightly guided caliphs” supposedly
held each requirement, and al-Baghdadi says that he fulfills each requirement as well
(Wood, 2016, p.16).
Over the past few centuries, many declared caliphates have been lax on the
requirements for caliphs. Historically, many of the so-called caliphs were unsuccessful
leaders. Some Muslims believe the leaders did not meet the requirements to actually be
caliphs, which is why they were unsuccessful (Wood, 2016, p. 16). Well educated Islamic
scholars from Iraq and Syria who have pledged their allegiance to ISIS argue that alBaghdadi is the eighth legitimate caliph in history, since he and the other caliphs
recognized met all the necessary criteria. One of the ISIS Islamic scholars, a cleric named
Turki al-Bin’ali, declared that Muhammad guaranteed that there will only be twelve
caliphs before the end of the world. A Rice University history professor named David
Cook noted that, according to literal interpretations of certain Quranic texts and quotes
from certain imams, “the battles preceding the Day of Judgment will take place in
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modern Syria, with a final showdown in the year 1500 of the Islamic Hijra calendar, or
A.D. 2076” (Wood, 2016, p. 17). Many of al-Baghdadi’s followers believe that Caliph
Ibrahim is continuing the prophesy of the Quran, and they are destined to continue his
goals no matter what opposition they face. Al-Baghdadi’s favorability and notoriety as an
official caliph coupled with ISIS success against Shiites gave the terrorist organization an
appearance of legitimacy. In order to spread the message of the caliphate, expand the
group’s ideological support throughout the world, and accumulate more members, the
group utilizes social media (Celso, 2015).
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Chapter 2: History of Online ISIS Propaganda, Radicalization, and Recruitment
The ISIS caliphate utilizes the internet, specifically social media, to gain support
through political propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment. After some viewers observe
political propaganda from the Islamic State, they believe that the group’s ideology is
worthy of believing and that the terrorists are actually fighters for good. Once someone
believes ISIS propaganda, he or she is then radicalized whether or not the person actually
acts upon those radicalized beliefs. After a person is radicalized, he or she may contact a
radical social media user or be contacted by ISIS members or sympathizers who will
attempt to convince the person to join the terrorist organization. This process became
simpler and more successful than it was in the past due to access to the internet (Chatfield
et al., 2015).
Terrorist networks have utilized numerous forms of media throughout history, but
the media could be expensive, difficult to disseminate to large audiences, and not as
successful as the internet is. In the past, for example, some terrorist organizations
employed fliers to inform potential recruits about the groups’ goals, ideologies, and other
important information. Compared to the internet, the fliers were expensive, more difficult
to broadly share with large numbers of local people, and not very effective in the
recruitment of Westerners from overseas (Chatfield et al., 2015).
ISIS also benefits from another positive aspect of the internet: people can view
web pages and emails at any time from numerous locations and on multiple devices like
computers and smartphones. The internet revolutionized the dissemination of terrorist
propaganda, and ISIS members and sympathizers can use social media wherever they
have internet connection. Additionally, because terrorists are now able to utilize
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anonymous chartrooms and social media accounts to attempt to radicalize and recruit
people, they can reduce the risk of prosecution. Ease of access and anonymity to this
degree are benefits that were widely unavailable to terrorist recruiters before they utilized
social media platforms (Chatfield et al., 2015).
The following example demonstrates how powerful even one ISIS sympathizer’s
social media account can be when it comes to reaching others. From February 2013 to
February 2014 a research team examined 2,405 Twitter accounts that foreign fighters
read on a regular basis. Out of all the accounts examined, 1,778 users, or approximately
74 percent, had only one jihadist follower each. Only 46 users, or approximately 1.9
percent, had 10 or more jihadist followers each. However, one Twitter account, with the
username @shamiwitness, was “the most popular and influential Twitter user to the
foreign fighters in Syria” (Chatfield et al., 2015, p. 241). The account had approximately
17,700 followers (Raidió Teilifís Éireann, 2014) and made thousands of posts in English
in order to reach a Western audience. Although @shamiwitness had no official
connections to any jihadist organizations, it politically and morally supported jihadists in
Syria. Unfortunately for the researchers, however, it is impossible to determine exactly
how much impact the account had on its audience since radicalization does not always
result in action. An American may accept ISIS ideology, for example, but never carry out
attacks or fight overseas for the organization. Despite the above limitation, however, the
researchers were able to view how well the account assisted individual jihadists by
sharing their information to a larger audience (Chatfield et al., 2015).
Twitter shut down all of the most popular jihadist accounts examined in the
research by October 6, 2014, except for @shamiwitness. Over the course of October
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2014, the account sent thousands of tweets from its account. Although an official member
of ISIS did not run the account, the far-reaching dissemination of information led Indian
authorities to believe that the account was too dangerous for the government to not arrest
its user. After the arrest of the @shamiwitness operator on December 13, 2014 in India,
Twitter also removed his account like the other jihadist accounts. ISIS received free
advertisement, and some Twitter users may have become radicalized, due to
@shamiwitness, and that required no extra work by the terror organization. The user’s
dedication to the group and his dissemination of information shows how much of an
impact a single person can have if he or she becomes radicalized by ISIS (Chatfield et al.,
2015).
Some of the most useful tools to help disseminate information, which
@shamiwitness utilized, are sharing, replying, and “hashtagging.” Sharing a post on
social media, or “retweeting” on Twitter, takes information posted by a certain account
and shares it through another account. Anyone who shares a post on his social media
page enables all of his followers to see the shared post. If hundreds or thousands of
accounts share a post, hundreds or thousands of other people could see it, if not more.
Each time @shamiwitness retweeted a radical account on Twitter, all of his followers
could witness the post and retweet it to their followers. Whenever a person replies or
comments on a post, his followers are often able to see the response as well as the
original post, whether they follow the account that created the original post or not. If
@shamiwitness responded to a radical Twitter user, people who were not originally
following that radical would be exposed to a new jihadist account to follow (Chatfield et
al., 2015).

Howell 11
One of the reasons @shamiwitness was so successful in attracting a large
audience was because the user constantly tweeted or retweeted about subjects related to
jihad. Another reason was that it retweeted numerous sources that likely added to the
user’s credibility. Gathering thousands of followers can be difficult for a social media
account. If successful in gathering such numbers, however, an account can widely
disseminate information to various countries and various types of people (Chatfield et al.,
2015).
The @shamiwitness account utilized specific hashtags in order for its followers to
see what the user, and other users similar to @shamiwitness, said about a certain subject
or belief. “Hashtag” refers to a way in which people around the world can see posts about
a particular topic. A “hashtag” is a word or phrase preceded by the “#” symbol. Although
the tool began on Twitter, it is also widely utilized on social media sites such as
Facebook and Instagram. For example, if someone wanted to see what people around the
world are saying about Syria, he could simply search “#Syria.” Disseminating
information, therefore, can be quite effective on social media, and it has the potential of
reaching large swaths of people if users attract large audiences (Chatfield et al., 2015).
Many ISIS and ISIS-related Twitter accounts organize hashtag campaigns. They
pick a specific hashtag, such as #CalamityWillBefallUS in 2014, and encourage their
supporters to post numerous tweets that incorporate the hashtag. The more times a
specific hashtag is posted on Twitter, the more likely it is to trend. All Twitter users can
see a trending list of the most popular hashtags on the website. ISIS members hope their
hashtags will surface on the trending list in order for their message to reach an even
larger audience (“Hashtag Terror,” 2014).
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ISIS has yet to successfully make a hashtag trend since other popular topics
usually receive more attention. For that reason, ISIS encourages utilizing hashtags that
are already trending. For instance, if ISIS accounts use the hashtag #2016election on
Twitter, people who search that hashtag may inadvertently read tweets filled with ISIS
propaganda that are among discussions covering presidential election news (“Hashtag
Terror,” 2014).
In order to best disseminate information, ISIS mainly utilizes Twitter. Besides the
anonymity and dissemination capabilities of Twitter described previously, the
organization depends on the social media website for account replacement. After
anonymous accounts began sharing the ISIS propaganda video of the execution of
American journalist James Foley in 2014, Twitter adopted a more stringent security
policy that allowed the company to remove ISIS-related accounts that shared imagery
from the video (“Hashtag Terror,” 2014). Once Twitter deletes or suspends accounts,
however, ISIS members and sympathizers can quickly create new accounts to continue
sharing propaganda. Although ISIS members and sympathizers utilize jihadist Facebook
pages, for example, the pages are much more difficult to manage than Twitter accounts.
Facebook pages often take longer to create, and the security policies often restrict more
jihadist content. Subsequently, Facebook deletes more accounts than Twitter (“Hashtag
Terror,” 2014).
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Chapter 3: Seeking a Target Audience
ISIS utilizes social media to successfully radicalize people and disseminate
information, but recruitment usually occurs through other means. Despite the common
assumption that online recruiting is extremely successful throughout the West, one
German study determined that only about 18 percent of German jihadists have been
recruited over the internet. Despite the fact that a majority of recruitment does not occur
from social media and other websites, ISIS recruiters still gain nearly one fifth of their
recruits from online sources. That is a substantial number of recruits that can become
interested in ISIS from other countries with little to no immediate personal interaction
with the organization (Franz, 2015, p. 10).
The two strongest methods of recruitment in Germany are communication with
radical mosques and imams (23 percent of recruitment to radical organizations) and
communication with loved ones who have fought in the name of jihad (30 percent of
recruitment to radical organizations). Communication, in this sense, usually referred to
discussions in person, over the telephone, or through some other form of one-on-one
conversations. It is important to note that although social media accounts “often initiate
interest in the jihad, recruitment is a more complex issue and does usually not occur via
electronic means” (Franz, 2015, p. 10).
In order to recruit interested people on social media that may not be able to be
easily contacted in person, ISIS rewarded members for their online efforts. According to
Elzbieta Karska, a Polish human rights lawyer who chairs a United Nations committee
that is studying ISIS recruitment, recruiters received from 2,000 dollars to 10,000 dollars
per recruit in 2015 depending on the quality of the person (Winsor, 2015). ISIS was able
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to pay their recruiters large amounts of money because the organization had control over
numerous oil fields in the Middle East that provided funding to the caliphate, and they
also tax people who live within the caliphate (Masi, September 8, 2014). Karska stated,
“If [recruits were] well educated like computer specialists or doctors, [recruiters] were
paid more” (Winsor, 2015). Additionally, recruiters received a monetary bonus if two of
their recruits marry because they may produce children who will become future members
of the caliphate. Social media allowed ISIS members to seek more well educated people
from the West, which resulted in higher pay (Winsor, 2015).
Recruiters approach Westerners in different ways according to the potential
recruits’ beliefs or social status. In a 2015 Mediterranean Quarterly articled entitled
“Popijihadism: Why Young European Muslims Are Joining the Islamic State,” author
Barbara Franz, a political science professor at Rider University, recorded findings from
her research on the demographics of ISIS recruits. Franz assessed that “most Western
fighters are men under forty years of age” (Franz, 2015, p. 8). Franz argued that the
reasons Western Muslims are specifically attracted to ISIS vary widely, but three reasons
are common: the rise of a Sunni caliphate that could one day rule the world, the fight
against oppressive Shiite governments in Syria and Iraq, and an escape from Western
communities where many Muslims do not feel welcome (Franz, 2015, p. 8).
First, many ISIS recruits wish to join the terrorist organization because of the idea
of a pure and unified caliphate. Many young fighters see the caliphate as the future of
Sunni Islam, and they think that it is only the beginning of a regime that will eventually
spread across the world. When ISIS fighters began to kill Kurds, Christians, and other
people groups, the terrorist group posted the videos of the killings on social media. Franz
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stated, “Once IS began to attack Kurds and slaughter Yazidids instead of [President]
Bashar al-Assad’s soldiers, the logic surrounding the jihad as a holy war against
unbelievers became the key justification for jihadism” (Franz, 2015, p. 8). For many,
seeing people of different beliefs as infidels made it seem as if ISIS was on the offensive
for the sake of religious purity rather than for the sake of political gain. Viewing ISIS
violence as grounds for religious cleansing rather than simple fighting between different
political groups attracted numerous Westerners to the cause of ISIS, and many even
traveled to the Middle East to join the fight against people who they believed to be
infidels (Franz, 2015).
The second reason that some Western Muslims, specifically those in Europe,
joined ISIS was to fight against Syria and Iraq. More Western Muslims fought against
Syria than Iraq because they considered President al-Assad’s government responsible for
the two hundred thousand dead civilians and millions of displaced Syrians, which many
fighters saw as genocide. ISIS members and sympathizers in the region largely accepted
that the Shiite government incessantly killed civilians simply due to their Sunni faith.
Numerous Westerners wish to fight alongside ISIS because they consider themselves
heroic rescuers who are completing the will of God, as declared by numerous ISIS videos
and speeches. The desire to become a hero to a nation while simultaneously desiring to
experience adventure is referred to as the “Hemingway Phenomenon,” (Franz, 2015, p. 8)
named after Ernest Hemingway who fought in the Spanish Civil War in a desire for
justice and adventure. Soldiers throughout history, despite the war or situation, often feel
allegiance to those with whom they fight side-by-side. That bond, along with the
“Hemingway Phenomenon,” caused Westerners to be even further radicalized into other
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acts of jihad around the world. When there is trust and mutual respect between two
soldiers who have protected each other, it is more likely that one would sympathize with
the other’s beliefs about a wide range of topics, including jihad. Once someone becomes
radicalized by one of his or her fellow fighters, that person could then be utilized as a
social media recruiter, or another type of ISIS recruiter, in that person’s Western country
(Franz, 2015, p. 9).
For some Muslims who immigrate into the West, or even first generation Western
Muslims, the main cause for radicalization is not the caliphate or the desire to become a
hero. Instead, the third reason that some Western Muslims are radicalized due to issues
with integrating into the West and finding social mobility. Issues that plague these
Muslims, such as alleged racism and loneliness due to being an outsider, often lead to
psychological issues. Additionally, most of the jihadists examined in the study who held
jobs worked for minimum wage in a low-skill occupation. A recent study of German
radicals found that 249 of the 322 who went to fight with ISIS had committed a crime in
the West. Many of these crimes were violent and included drug offenses and theft. “Jihad
attracts people who feel they do not have a legal and social space within the German and
European society” (Franz, 2015, p. 19). Western Muslim immigrants, who sometimes
experience racial and religious discrimination, are able to witness mosques in their new
countries that offer an apparent unity that they do not often experience in other places
within the Western world. Some radical Western mosques, for example, consist of people
of many nationalities and ethnicities praying next to each other and interacting together.
The uniting of different races and nationalities through the ISIS ideology can entice
Westerners who may feel like outsiders in their new countries. Therefore, Western
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Muslims who accept this idea of unity often do not recognize that the inclusivity does not
include different interpretations of Islam (Franz, 2015, p. 11).
Although the above reasons explain why some Sunni Muslims in the West join
ISIS, it is important to acknowledge that a common misconception about Westerners who
become radicalized by ISIS is that they are all poor and/or Muslim. A 2016 article
entitled “Vulnerabilities among young Westerners joining ISIS” contends that a majority
of Western ISIS fighters are financially stable, and many were not originally of the
Muslim faith. Similarly to Franz’s assessment, however, the authors concluded that much
of the ISIS appeal stems from the organization’s ability to provide an identity to people
who do not currently have confidence in their own. According to the report, the majority
of people radicalized by ISIS are “everyday young people who are in social transition, on
the margins of society, or amidst a crisis of identity” (Yu and Haque, 2016). All three
issues are related to the difficulty of finding an identity as young people transition into
adulthood. Joining ISIS helps discouraged youths feel a true sense of purpose and
identity.
Dr. Seong Yu and Dr. Sultan Haque, who wrote the report, argued that
psychological studies have shown that humans tend to seek certainty when developing
beliefs. Ideologies or beliefs that leave ambiguities or uncertainties are often unattractive
to individuals compared to beliefs in absolute certainties. The worldview of ISIS leaves
no room for ambiguities, and it splits the world into absolute good and absolute evil.
Radicals sometimes easily accept rigid and simplistic beliefs because they desire
structure in a liberal Western society where they do not feel accepted (Yu and Haque,
2016).
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Chapter 4: Radicalization and Recruitment Tactics
ISIS utilizes differing strategies when disseminating propaganda. When appealing
to locals, ISIS often generates solidarity within the Sunni Muslim community,
emotionally connecting with local issues, providing religious reasons to fight infidels,
and promoting the organization’s ideologies. In Syria, for example, ISIS recruited Sunnis
by letting them know that ISIS came to protect them and provide them with
reinforcements to fight the Shiite government (Chatfield et al., 2015).
But when appealing to the global community of both Muslims and others, the
group tends to show that ISIS is feared and powerful, intimidating public opinion in the
West, arguing the morality of terrorism, and urging people to shift their perspectives on
violent ideologies. ISIS seeks to radicalize current Muslims by arguing conservative,
Sunni interpretations of Quranic verses. When radicalizing those who are not Muslims,
however, ISIS teaches its audience, through videos and readings, why the group believes
a radical Sunni faith is supreme. One of the goals of ISIS is to unite Westerners of
different backgrounds through the same jihadist views (Chatfield et al., 2015).
ISIS propaganda, including videos and pictures, is usually of extremely high
quality and evokes strong emotions in and grasps the attention of potential recruits.
Matthew Olsen, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said, “Importantly, the
group… views itself as the now-leader of a global jihadist movement. It turns out timely,
high-quality media, and it uses social media to secure a widespread following” (Yan,
2016). Former jihadi and author of “Radical: My Journey out of Islamist Extremism,”
Maajid Nawaz, stated, “[Western governments] are way behind. They are far superior
and advanced than we are when it comes to new media technologies, social media, when
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it comes to video production qualities, and in disseminating their propaganda over the
internet” (Yan, 2016). As stated earlier, ISIS oil and tax money has afforded the
organization the opportunity to buy expensive applications and equipment in order to
produce videos and advertisements that resemble Hollywood quality. Videos include
executions, explosions, music, narrators, and other aspects that showcase the brutality
and power of the group (Yan, 2016).
Max Abrahms, a professor of public policy and political science at Northeastern
University, said that the high quality propaganda videos are not only recruiting
unaffiliated people but also people who are already affiliated with other terrorist groups.
Abrahms said that the brutal videos are partially meant to intimidate rival terrorist groups.
Additionally, the videos help ISIS recruit radicals away from rival groups either out of
fear of defeat or out of the radicals’ desire for power and/or religious purity (Masi,
August 20, 2014).
Official ISIS propaganda comes from its own news organization, the Al Hayat
Media Center. The mission statement of the news center is to “convey the message of the
Islamic State in different languages with the aim of unifying Muslims under one flag”
(Masi, August 20, 2014). In order to convey legitimacy and fear, the news agency
publishes quarterly reports of all attacks and murders committed by ISIS. Additionally,
the agency created a video series called Mujatweets, which ISIS translated into at least
four languages, to convey the caliphate as enjoyable. Displaying both the brutal strength
as well as the alleged “relaxed fun” of the caliphate allows ISIS to appeal to potential
recruits in various ways (Masi, August 20, 2014). Mujatweets often shows ISIS members
engaging in charitable projects, taking care of children, and receiving praise from
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civilians. The series also showcases Westerners who joined the caliphate, and they share
testimonies about how fun and meaningful their lives became after becoming jihadists
(“Hashtag Terror,” 2014).
ISIS also utilizes its online magazine entitled Dabiq in order to reach potential
recruits and current members. Not only does the magazine include propaganda, but it also
includes articles on Quranic stories with radicalized interpretations. Numerous forms of
propaganda afford ISIS the ability to reach potential recruits in numerous ways through
social media (Masi, August 20, 2014).
One way in which ISIS propaganda often radicalizes Sunni Muslims is by
strengthening the idea of tribalism, such as Sunnis versus Shiites, and promoting the idea
of defeating the threat posed by the opposing view. The opposing view for ISIS is any
group that does not agree with the caliphate’s interpretation of the Quran. An example of
the above radicalization strategy would be terrorist networks attacking a Western
government or one of its allies simply to evoke a counterterrorism response. The terrorist
network is then able to magnify the “political and moral decay” (Chatfield et al., 2015) of
the Western government in order to establish a just versus unjust framework that will
radicalize certain people.
Additionally, ISIS promotes lone wolf attacks in order to incite fear in and to
damage multiple parts of the world at once. Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the
official spokesman for ISIS, encouraged lone wolf attacks, in which an individual kills
“infidels” in whatever way possible. Al-Adnani says that lone wolves must not fear
death. Instead, they must trust that Allah is being glorified through the action. When ISIS
members come across an infidel, the spokesman stated, members must “kill him in any
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manner or way however it may be. Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek
anyone’s verdict” (Chatfield et al., 2015). Al-Adnani’s statement could push individuals
to feel self-empowered and religiously obligated to kill others who they believe to be
infidels, and many other ISIS members have shared his message. Although no research
contends that al-Adnani was directly responsible for radicalizing any of the ISIS-related
lone wolves who attacked the Middle East and Western nations over the last two years,
the attackers often cite ISIS propaganda as the motive for their jihadist actions (Chatfield
et al., 2015).
According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a counter-extremism think tank
based in London, more than 3,000 Westerners joined ISIS by 2015 as a result of
recruiting on social media and offline. Not all of the Westerners, however, actually
traveled to the Middle East to fight alongside ISIS members. Some Westerners simply
joined the organization without committing any terrorist acts. Many ISIS magazines and
videos attract recruits by making the caliphate seem like a sovereign nation filled with a
family of Muslims who simply seek Allah’s will. For men, ISIS claims that it will find
them wives and provide them an acceptable place to live and start a family. After ISIS
convinces women to move to the caliphate, the women often become “jihadi wives” who
will be given over to male recruits (“Three British Schoolgirls,” 2015).
The ISIS approach towards recruiting women is distinctly different than the
approach used for men. A social media campaign called “al-Zawra” utilizes posts and
videos to explain the role of women in a jihadist setting. The worldwide campaign
focuses heavily on domestic activities, such as cooking and sewing, and it explains how
important such activities are for the caliphate. Many of the videos also, however, explain
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that women will also be utilized for recruitment and combat. In the videos, ISIS members
explain that women who join the caliphate will learn technical skills such as software and
editing, and they will also learn combat skills, such as hand-to-hand combat and weapon
usage. Upon arrival, however, jihadi wives are often also forced into sex slavery for the
pleasure of ISIS members (Masi, October 21, 2014).
Another way ISIS utilizes social media to manipulate women is through false
narratives. Western and local women have been kidnapped while under the impression
that they were coming to certain ISIS-controlled areas for other reasons. Two young
women from the United States, for instance, went to Syria believing that they would
participate in a humanitarian aid project. Online ISIS recruiters told the women to meet a
man once they arrived at the border of Syria, and he would take them to the project
location. Once the man helped the women enter the country, he took them to an ISIS
compound where he forced them to serve as sex slaves for fighters (Barrow, 2015).
The ISIS treatment of women, even their own recruits, is often abusive.
Kidnapped women from the West or other cultures often face more brutality than Sunni
women since some ISIS members see them as simply infidels. One of the main reasons
women are needed in the caliphate is to bear children who will be the new generation of
ISIS fighters (Barrow, 2015).
Members of ISIS manipulate Westerners, such as the example of the American
women listed above, in order to recruit them to join the caliphate. As stated by Yu and
Haque, lonely young people are sometimes attracted to ISIS due to the ideology giving
them another option besides Western society, but they are also attracted to the group
because of the attention they receive from recruiters. In order to recruit Westerners,
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especially those who are not Muslims, ISIS members utilize an al Qaeda manual from alBaghdadi’s time in the organization entitled “A Course in the Art of Recruiting.” Unlike
Al Qaeda, however, ISIS is very open to who they recruit. Al Qaeda did not recruit
women and nonbelievers, since the group sought devout male Muslims, but ISIS recruits
everyone that it can since the goal of the caliphate is to continue to grow and gain power
(Engel, 2015). The book contains numerous tips and steps that can be utilized in order to
recruit Westerners, but one researcher named J.M. Berger at The Brookings Institution
summarized the main steps into a simple five-step recruitment process: discovery, create
micro-community, isolation, shift to private communications, and identify and encourage
action (Berger, November 9, 2015).
The discovery process typically depends on the recruiters. Usually recruiters
make connections to potential recruits on social media through mutual friends or family
members. Sometimes, however, Westerners attract recruiters due to the potential recruits’
social media activity surrounding ISIS propaganda or jihadist accounts (Winsor, 2015).
When Westerners contact or are contacted by recruiters, the potential recruits’ original
interest in ISIS can often be traced back to the mainstream media. Western news agencies
typically try to be extremely careful in how they cover ISIS news stories so that the
reporters do not inadvertently amplify the ideology of the terrorist organization. Despite
the agencies’ caution to not advertise ISIS causes, however, the often highly publicize
Western recruits, and “many, perhaps most, potential recruits first learn about ISIS from
the media, only then seeking it out on social media” (Berger, November 9, 2015).
Some potential recruits may have no faith in Islam before being contacted by
recruiters. The ISIS manual actually encourages recruiters to seek nonreligious people
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during the discovery process. One passage in the manual states, “You should take
precautions against the religious people whom you invite, because maybe they will reject
the da’wa (invitation) and end up being the reason for our defeat” (Engel, 2015). As
stated previously, ISIS seeks members from groups who are lonely and need meaning in
life. The al Qaeda manual suggests that atheists perfectly fit that description.
Nonreligious Western youths from Muslim families are preferred due to their nonintegration into society, as stated by Franz, and because the manual states that there is
righteousness in pointing youth back to their religious Muslim origins. Also, nonreligious
Muslims may know many of the basics of the Quran but not a detailed knowledge of
Islam. That allows recruiters to likely indoctrinate the youths quicker and easier with
their radical interpretation of the text (Engel, 2015).
Spiritual isolation is not the only form of loneliness recruiters seek after for
potential recruits, however. The manual calls for recruiters to prey on students
specifically, since school can often be a lonely place for vulnerable people. When the
book discusses the reason for seeking high school students, it states “the merits of this
sector: 1. Often they have pure minds; 2. It is very safe to deal with them because they
are not likely to be spies, especially after they pass the stage of individual da’wa” (Engel,
2015).
When discussing college students, the manual places emphasis on the usefulness
of both zealousness and loneliness. On this subject, the manual states, “The university is
like a place of isolation for a period of four, five, or six years and is full of youths (full of
zeal, vigor, and anti-government sentiments)” (Engel, 2015). University students
experience a level of independence they never previously experienced. ISIS members use
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that freedom and isolation to try to indoctrinate students without being disrupted by
others. Once the potential recruits are discovered, a community forms around them
(Engel, 2015).
In order to create micro-community, different ISIS recruiters may contact the
same Westerner. This makes the potential recruit feel welcome and provides supporting
information about ISIS ideology. Recruiters spend thousands of hours developing
communication and relationships with potential recruits online, especially lonely people
who believe the recruiters to be friends (Barrow, 2015). The manual says recruiters
should never go more than a week without speaking to their Western prospects. Also,
potential recruits should never be suspicious of the recruiter’s true intent. In the manual,
it tells recruiters to “be careful of talking about the problems of the Muslims from the
beginning (of the relationship) so as not to make the relationship appear as your
recruiting him. He will say to himself, ‘you are doing all of this with me, just to recruit
me, etc.’” (Engel, 2015). Instead, the manual assures the reader that he will succeed in
recruiting an individual if the process is not rushed. It is at this stage in the process where
recruiters may begin speaking about “freedom fighters,” but the manual warns against
referring to terrorist groups by name. Additionally, whenever a news program reports on
ISIS or similar terrorist groups in a negative way, recruiters are encouraged to argue on
behalf of the terrorist groups without specifically endorsing them (Engel, 2015).
Although potential recruits may believe in radical Islam, they may dislike certain terrorist
groups because of what they have seen regarding such groups on the news (Berger,
November 9, 2015).
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For potential recruits of different faiths, ISIS recruiters often urge Westerners to
read passages from holy texts that the ISIS members can take out of context. A young
Sunday school teacher from Washington who considered herself a Christian, for instance,
began to be slowly and unknowingly radicalized by ISIS. People in her new microcommunity, after getting to know her, asked her to reexamine certain Bible verses to
make sure she actually understood the passages. One recruiter pointed to the verse John
12:44 that says, “And Jesus Christ cried out and said, ‘Whoever believes in me, believes
not in me, but in He who sent me’” (Callimachi, 2015). The recruiter explained that
although Jesus is a prophet, as accepted in the Muslim faith, he is not actually God. This
caused the potential recruit to question her faith and pushed her to trust in the microcommunity as well as the Muslim faith in her time of doubt (Callimachi, 2015).
Once they have gained trust, recruiters slowly begin to isolate potential recruits
even more from their friends and family. After potential recruits are converted to radical
Islam, recruiters often recommend that the new radicals end communication on social
media and offline with anyone who may try to influence them to disavow ISIS (Berger,
November 9, 2015). In order to avoid suspicion by outside groups and to further isolate
radicals, ISIS recruiters often tell potential recruits who convert to Islam to keep their
Islamic conversations and faith secret. The recruiters often claim that the secrecy will
keep converts from being labeled as terrorists by infidels. Radicals often obey the call to
secrecy out of respect to their new companions and out of fear of persecution. Recruiters
actually, however, tell recruits to keep Islamic activities secret so that no one will
interrupt the recruitment process (Barrow, 2015).
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Further isolation can come from recruiters encouraging Islamic studies. As stated
in the manual, a recruiter “should also make a schedule for him to listen to at least one
lecture daily [by an extremist imam or teacher]. These lectures, books, and pamphlets
must become his best friends” (Engel, 2015). When potential recruits replace the time
they usually spend with friends and families with radical texts instead, the Westerners are
often further radicalized and isolated.
After isolating recruits, ISIS members often encourage Westerners to
communicate with them via more private means, such as calling them on the telephone or
sending encrypted messages. These more private conversations are usually where
recruiters can answer questions and give details about illegal activities that can be
discussed with less likelihood of alerting law enforcement or the intelligence community.
Once a more private conversation begins, the recruiters often try to suggest that
Westerners join ISIS in practice instead of just accepting the ideology (Berger, November
9, 2015). If the recruit officially expresses interest in joining ISIS, other ISIS members
conduct an interview utilizing encryption software, proxy servers, and messaging
services. The three interview tools allow ISIS members to know what a recruit looks like
and to ask him or her questions in order to determine if the Westerner is actually a spy
(Masi, September 8, 2014).
To better understand the issues that encryption creates for the intelligence
community and law enforcement, one should observe the legal debate that stemmed from
the ISIS-inspired mass shooting in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015.
Even after the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) retrieved the iPhone of one of the
shooter’s, the agency could not guess the PIN code needed to access the locked device.
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When the FBI requested for the Apple Corporation to develop special software to bypass
the code to retrieve the information inside the device, the company refused. Without the
PIN code, the information inside the cell phone was encrypted and unusable for the FBI.
The government’s difficulty to retrieve the information, although they possessed the
smart phone, reveals the security of encryption and locked devices. Like Apple, Google
promotes default encryption on its Android devices, and a popular messaging application
called WhatsApp “has doubled-down on encryption and has even introduced secured
video chat” (Selyukh, 2016).
Communication that occurs through encrypted means is often referred to as “dark
space” communication. United States Representative Michael McCaul, Homeland
Security Committee chairman, asked Michael Steinbach, FBI counterterrorism division
assistant director, in a hearing if the federal government knows how much dark space
communication is occurring. Steinbach responded, “No, we don’t and that’s the problem
– the ability to know what they’re saying in these encrypted communication situations is
troubling” (Sanchez, 2015). ISIS members understand the extreme complexity and
security of communicating in dark space. The use of encrypted messages and videos, as
well as the use of PIN code protected devices, allows IS to safely recruit Westerners and
discover more about them.
ISIS members use past knowledge as well as the Westerners’ personality traits in
order to identify how the potential recruits can be most useful to the jihadist cause. A
wealthy teenager, for example, may be able to afford to purchase a plane ticket and travel
to the Middle East in order to battle alongside ISIS fighters. Recruits who are less
wealthy may not be able to travel to the Middle East, but they can perform lone wolf
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attacks in their home countries. As stated by Franz (2015) and Yu and Haque (2016),
people from numerous races, nationalities, and socioeconomic classes are interested in
ISIS for numerous reasons. Recruiters are trained to utilize recruits in the most efficient
manner possible. Members of ISIS ensure recruits, whether they can travel to the Middle
East or not, that they can cause extreme damage to infidels no matter the new radicals’
circumstances. That is one of the reasons attacks occur worldwide (Berger, November 9,
2015).
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Chapter 5: Counterterrorism Efforts
Although the federal government largely understands the target audiences of ISIS
social media accounts, legislators and agencies often disagree on the best
countermeasures to combat jihadist recruitment. Two of the major issues in combating
ISIS recruitment are constitutionality and effectiveness. The government’s responsibility
to adhere to the Constitution, though appropriate, hinders the number and scope of policy
options that can be implemented to reduce the effectiveness of ISIS propaganda and
recruiting. This chapter discusses the constitutional issues of censorship, addresses
numerous relevant policy options to limit ISIS radicalization, and reviews the successes
and limitations of those policy options.
The free speech clause in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
declares that the government can only limit speech if it poses a clear and present danger.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes coined the clear and present danger test in
1919, but legal scholars argued the interpretation of “clear and present danger” until
Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969. In that case, the Supreme Court set the current precedent
for clear and present danger when it overturned the conviction of a member of the Ku
Klux Klan, who used inflammatory words against minorities, because his speech did not
incite imminent lawless action (Eckholm, 2015).
Erik Eckholm, a journalist for the New York Times, explained the current
constitutional issue with censoring ISIS. He explains that Justice Holmes described
unprotected free speech with the example of yelling the word “fire” in a crowded theater
because it could lead to imminent danger by causing a stampede. Eckholm continued,
however, that “an article praising the merits of causing stampedes, even offering phrases
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to shout, is not closely enough linked to an imminent, actual threat to be outlawed”
(Eckholm, 2015). Although ISIS-sympathizers in the United States often state the merits
of violence and even explain how to commit violence, their speech is protected under the
First Amendment if it does not incite imminent lawless action or clear and present
danger.
In February 2016, a trial began in a federal district court that may help more
clearly define the government’s ability to prosecute Americans who utilize social media
to incite terror. The FBI arrested a Missouri woman by the name of Safya Roe Yassin
after she retweeted multiple posts from ISIS-sympathetic Twitter accounts. According to
an article by the Wall Street Journal, “Ms. Yassin, a Muslim woman born in the U.S., has
been charged with conspiracy and two counts of transmitting a threat across state lines,
facing a maximum of 15 years in prison. She has pleaded not guilty” (Hong, August 12,
2016). Although there was no accusation against Yassin for planning any type of attack,
the federal government claimed that she called for the murder of multiple military
members and United States employees because some of the posts that Yassin retweeted
contained the names and addresses of federal workers, among other personal information.
One of the tweets included the phrase “Wanted to kill” (Hong, August 12, 2016).
The federal government utilized a legal statute against Yassin that prohibits
interstate communication that has “any threat to injure” (Hong, August 12, 2016).
Yassin’s public defender requested that the case be dismissed under the First Amendment
since the defense viewed the language of the government’s statute as vague and overly
broad. One reason Yassin’s case may be important for the future of ISIS-related social
media accounts is that it could define how the federal government interprets retweets.
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Since Yassin did not write the tweet herself, her attorneys argue that it is not a direct
threat (Hong, August 12, 2016). In order to better prepare for trial, on April 11, 2017
Yassin and her attorneys waived Yassin’s right to a speedy trial and requested to
reschedule the trial for a later date. At the completion of this thesis there were no other
updates available (“USA v. Yassin,” 2017).
The United States can continue using the above statute to combat ISISsympathetic posts on social media from Americans, but the Yassin case could determine
if the statute also refers to retweets. The government does not largely limit speech, but
new constitutional questions continue to arise from the federal attempts to curb certain
communication on social media.
A House Energy and Commerce subcommittee meeting in November 2015
emphasized the limits to government censorship. When asked if the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) could shut down terrorist websites, former FCC
Chairman Tom Wheeler said, “We cannot underestimate the challenge. I’m not sure our
authority extends to [shutting down the websites], but I do think there are specific things
we can do” (Trujillo, 2015). Wheeler then stated that the FCC can urge technology
companies to fight against certain profiles and users, but the chairman declared that the
government will not enforce the removal of jihadist online users against the will of social
media companies (Trujillo, 2015).
In January 2016, members of the Obama administration and other top officials
traveled to California in order to urge technology companies to work with the federal
government, as Wheeler suggested above. High-ranking officials such as Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper, FBI Director James Comey, Attorney General
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Loretta Lynch, and members of Obama’s staff met with the executives of online
companies to share ideas on how to fight online recruitment and radicalization. One of
the goals of the meeting was to discuss how to “help others to create, publish and amplify
alternative content that would undercut” (McKitterick, 2016) ISIS. The list of technology
companies present at the meeting included Google, Apple, Microsoft, LinkedIn, Twitter,
and Facebook. The companies claim to remove pro-terrorist content whenever it appears
on their websites, but the corporations also noted that they aimed to limit interference
with language that could be argued as protected under the First Amendment
(McKitterick, 2016).
Critics could argue that it is unethical for the federal government to become
involved in telling social media companies how to respond to illegal activities, but no
court has deemed the practice illegal. Furthermore, federal agencies are not mandating
companies to monitor or report in any way. Instead, the government shares tactics that
could aid the companies in monitoring and removing certain language from social media
websites. Thus, the companies have the power to choose whether or not to listen to the
advice.
Many critics still deride the practice as pointless. Some critics claim that
whenever a social media company suspends an ISIS or ISIS-sympathetic account,
someone creates another jihadist account to replace it. Some refer to the removal practice
as “whack-a-mole” because, like in the arcade game “Whac-a-Mole,” every time a
problem is taken away, another appears. Brookings Institution researcher J.M. Berger,
however, claims that the “whack-a-mole” critique is invalid (Berger, April 2, 2015).
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Berger, along with technologist Jonathon Morgan, collected data from millions of
Twitter accounts, thousands of which belonged to ISIS supporters. According to Berger,
Twitter suspended tens of thousands of ISIS-related accounts beginning in September
2014 (Berger, April 2, 2015). In response, ISIS members and sympathizers created
dozens of accounts that remained dormant until Twitter suspended active accounts. Even
as they lost many accounts, pro-ISIS users utilized various tactics to maintain their
audiences. Jihadist Twitter users often place a hashtag in the description of new accounts.
Similarly, a new account by the same user often has the same profile picture as the
suspended account. In order to ensure that followers know the new account is legitimate,
the new account will often include sequential numbers in the Twitter name. For instance,
if Twitter deleted an account called “Jihadist,” then an account called “Jihadist 2” with
the same profile picture would replace it. Since pro-ISIS users do not know if or when
Twitter will delete their accounts, they sometimes encourage their followers to search for
accounts with the same hashtag in the description, with the same profile picture, and/or
the same name if Twitter removes current accounts from the website (Parrish, 2016).
Although new accounts appeared during September, the number of new accounts
ISIS-sympathizers created after the first month decreased as the amount of suspensions
continued to increase. As a result of Twitter suspending more ISIS profiles than ISIS
creates in response, less people are exposed to ISIS propaganda and recruitment on the
website (Berger, April 2, 2015).
A reduction in pro-ISIS accounts causes opposing users to overwhelm much of
the remaining ISIS-sympathizing accounts with spam. One example of spamming can be
seen in the flooding of ISIS hashtags with anti-ISIS information. Anti-ISIS users tweet
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using extremist hashtags approximately five times more than pro-ISIS accounts.
Although many anti-ISIS accounts attempted to spam the terrorist group before
September 2014, the uptick in account suspensions allowed anti-ISIS activists to severely
overwhelm the terror organization’s jihadist propaganda on Twitter (Berger, April 2,
2015).
By April 2015, approximately 10 percent of tweets from pro-ISIS accounts aimed
at rebuilding followers, through advertising and tagging former followers, rather than
focusing on the goals of recruiting, radicalizing, and disseminating propaganda.
Additionally, creating new accounts and waiting for new followers takes time away from
recruitment efforts. Private social media companies that directly suspend pro-ISIS
accounts devastate ISIS efforts. Other online companies contribute to the fight as well
(Berger, April 2, 2015).
To proactively protect themselves against any lawsuits based on discrimination or
freedom of speech, social media companies include reasons for account suspension in
their terms of use or other policy documents. Twitter says in its policies that “users may
not make threats of violence or promote violence, including threatening or promoting
terrorism” (Mastroianni, 2015), and Facebook outlaws any content in support of violent,
criminal, or terrorist activity. Cyberwarfare expert David Gewirtz explained that many
companies utilize analysis software, artificial intelligence, and manual research to find
users who violate policies. Social media companies also allow other users to report
activity that could go against the policies of the website in question (Mastroianni, 2015).
Two benefits governmental entities have when engaging with social media
companies are the fact that the websites are open to the public and that private companies
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must comply with the government during criminal investigations. Since social media
websites are open resources, governmental entities can take advantage of some of the
same tools that companies like Facebook and Twitter use to police themselves
(Mastroianni, 2015). For example, the Secret Service used tracking technology in 2015 to
perform open source monitoring of different social media websites in an attempt to
uncover terror threats to the Super Bowl (Swanson, 2015).
When private companies and government entities monitor social media websites,
however, some issues arise. Among these issues are the volume of material, the identity
of the user, and the seriousness of the post. More than one billion people use Facebook
every day, in addition to people on other social media websites, and they do so in
numerous languages and with numerous online abbreviations. For these reasons, it is
difficult for the federal government to identify every risk, despite the technology
available. Even if a comment is threatening, it may or may not be posted under the actual
name of the user. One of the San Bernardino shooters, for example, posted about her
radical views through an alias account. In addition to these issues, technology cannot
always distinguish the seriousness of a threat or whether or not a post is sarcastic. Even
though the federal government has access to public information, monitoring all of that
information is still difficult for intelligence agencies (Mastroianni, 2015).
One positive aspect that helps the federal government find needed information,
however, is that companies must assist law enforcement in criminal investigations.
During a criminal investigation, government agents can present a warrant to require a
company to overturn relevant information if the government has probable cause. If the
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company refuses, the government can apply for a warrant to receive such information
from the website (Mastroianni, 2015).
Companies, however, could be placed in a difficult situation when working with
the government on a criminal investigation. Gewirts stated, “How do you separate a highvitriol comment in the heat of an election season from legitimate threats” (Mastroianni,
2015)? Social media companies may struggle to decide if certain comments by one of
their users is threatening enough to reveal to the government, knowing that if people
think that they provide the government personal information, customers may no longer
use that service (Mastroianni, 2015).
Fortunately for social media companies, however, they are not alone in the private
sector fight against ISIS. Jigsaw, a Google think-tank, recently developed a project
known as Redirect. The project utilizes targeted advertising to coax potential ISIS
recruits towards anti-jihadist material. If someone searches the phrase “Islamic
martyrdom” on Google, for example, he may find ads that are linked to anti-ISIS videos.
Often the titles of the ads are ambiguous, so potential recruits may think the
advertisements are pro-ISIS propaganda. Within the first eight weeks of the program,
Google redirected approximately 300,000 people who used the search engine to find proISIS information. The redirected Google users watched about 425,000 minutes of the
independent anti-ISIS videos that Redirect advertised (Farrow, McHugh, and Connor,
2016).
Redirect can directly contribute to fighting radicalization. For instance, if a
potential recruit learns about ISIS on social media, he may also turn to Google to
continue his research on the terrorist organization. If Redirect advertisements help change
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the potential recruit’s view of jihadists, he is less likely to be drawn to ISIS-related social
media accounts than he would have if he was still sympathetic to the caliphate. Viewing
an anti-ISIS video, whether intentionally or unintentionally, can be effective in fighting
radicalization, but the news media could be unintentionally hindering the process.
In an NBC News article that discusses Redirect, the authors make an ironic
statement. They wrote, “The key is subtlety. A disaffected young person wondering if
ISIS is the answer to their problems would immediately dismiss a video with a warning
from the Department of Homeland Security” (Farrow et al., 2016). Although that
statement is likely true, the irony falls on the word “subtlety.” It is likely that heavy
reporting about Redirect from news agencies such as NBC could actually have a negative
effect on the program. If ISIS recruiters or the directors of ISIS-sympathetic social media
accounts become aware of Redirect, they could encourage their audiences to use different
search engines instead of Google. Additionally, if Redirect partners with other companies
like YouTube for more targeted advertising, ISIS could simply avoid using those
platforms as well. If search engine companies like Bing and Yahoo collaborated together
to create programs similar to Redirect, however, ISIS recruits would not have many other
search engine options for research. Nevertheless, in order to be more successful in subtly
exposing potential recruits to anti-ISIS propaganda, it may be in the best interest of
search engine companies like Google to keep programs such as Redirect relatively
unknown to news media despite the favorable attention such outlets may bring to both the
company due to its efforts and ingenuity.
Private companies benefit the online fight against ISIS, but the federal
government serves as the official line of defense for the American people. In June 2013,
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however, a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor named Edward Snowden
revealed to the Guardian newspaper that the United States government, in his opinion,
overreached its limits through numerous projects. One of the projects was the collection
of telephone records from millions of United States citizens (“Edward Snowden,” 2014).
Under the program, the government could, for instance, identify suspected ISIS
sympathizers and track who they communicate with over the telephone.
Outrage over the government collection of metadata sparked conversation
throughout the country. Many people claimed that the unwarranted collection of
information from American citizens violated the Patriot Act and even the Fourth
Amendment, which protects Americans against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Obama administration claimed that the program was a legal counterterrorism measure
that does not violate the rights of citizens. In May 2015, a federal appeals court ruled
against the federal government, stating that the telephone metadata collection did violate
the Patriot Act. The judges later sent the case to a lower court to determine whether the
collection program is also unconstitutional (De Vogue, 2015).
The lawsuit came just one month before the passage of the USA Freedom Act,
which ended bulk collection of telephone records and added limitations to government
collection. Ending the telephone metadata program increased the difficulty of
counterterrorism for the intelligence community, but it also reduced the controversy over
NSA surveillence (Hattem, 2016). Now the government must depend more heavily on
other counterterrorism programs to identify potential terrorists that may have been
identified through the former program.
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In order for the federal government to more actively combat online propaganda,
the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications,
established by the Obama administration in 2011, began producing propaganda parody
videos. A 2014 YouTube video, for example, entitled “Welcome to the ‘Islamic State’
land (ISIS/ISIL)” accumulated thousands of views. It included graphic images of
different types of killings utilized by ISIS. In the video there is no narrator, but phrases
and words appear on screen urging viewers to commit jihad. Towards the end of the
video, the ominous music that had been playing ended, and the tone of the video changed
as the words “Think again, turn away” appeared on screen. Additional videos and posts
designed to dissuade potential radicals were across numerous social media sites through
the “Think Again Turn Away” campaign. The campaign includes the languages English,
Arabic, Somali, and Urdu with different videos for each language. Included in the
campaign are personal testimonies of former radicals who realized jihadism is morally
wrong. It also included news coverage of terrorist deaths throughout the world. State
Department officials use social media websites to disseminate anti-radicalization
propaganda in the same way terrorist organizations utilize the same sites for the opposite
reason (Hansen, 2014).
Although the campaign attempts to scare would-be radicals from terrorism, some
social scientists claim that it could have the opposite effect. Dr. Jeff Victoroff, a
neurology and psychiatry professor at The University of Southern California who studies
terrorism psychology, warns that sometimes such campaigns have the opposite effect.
Victoroff stated, “If you challenge a young adult, particularly a male, with the fact that
something might be especially difficult or challenging, you’re just exciting them”
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(Hansen, 2014). Also, if ISIS sympathizers notice that the “Think Again Turn Away”
posts come from accounts they do not trust or know to be linked to the State Department,
then the posts may not have much effect on them. Just as law-abiding citizens respond to
the authority of police officers, Victoroff stated that ISIS sympathizers will respond to the
authority of Muslim leaders. Thus, Victoroff argues, if the United States notices that
someone is possibly becoming radicalized, then government officials should reach out to
that person through an imam that he trusts in order to rid that person of his interest in
radical Islamic terrorism through a positive approach to Islam (Hansen, 2014).
According to a recent Wall Street Journal article entitled “U.S. Revamps Line of
Attack in Social-Media Fight Against Islamic State,” the federal government realized that
the “Think Again Turn Away” campaign was largely ineffective. Besides the fact that
ISIS sympathizers often tried to ignore the campaign and that the videos sometimes
excited the audience about extremism the government also noticed that the “Think Again
Turn Away” posts were simply unpopular. For example, a video released by the State
Department in September 2016 about an ISIS defector received approximately 500 views
over the course of two months. Comparatively, ISIS execution videos often receive tens
of thousands of views within hours of being posted (Hong, 2016).
In response to the ineffectiveness of the “Think Again Turn Away” campaign, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced in July 2016 that it would dedicate
$10 million of its budget for an anti-extremism federal grant. The grant is being utilized
by public and private entities nationwide, such as local governments and nonprofits, in
order to disseminate the anti-terror message. Federal government officials invited
Facebook and other technology companies to develop competitions between college
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students worldwide. The competition requires students to develop their own campaigns to
assuage radicalization. DHS recognizes that young adults observe social media profiles of
others that are close in age. In the spring of 2016, 54 universities competed compared to
45 in the fall of 2015. Although many of the results appear positive to DHS, such as the
45 percent drop in pro-ISIS Twitter posts since June 2014, there is no way to measure
whether or not less people become radical. For example, it is possible that despite the
reduction of pro-ISIS tweets, even more people have radicalized since 2014 than in years
prior. Nicole Hong, the journalist who wrote The Wall Street Journal article, stated that it
is nearly impossible for the government “to quantify the number of people who were
convinced not to join a terrorist group. For that reason, some experts say the government
should be wary of devoting too many resources to this area and focus on military efforts
with more tangible results” (Hong, 2016).
The ineffectiveness of “Think Again Turn Away” could negatively affect a bill
sponsored by United States Representative Chuck Fleischmann that passed in the House
of Representatives in April 2016. Since its passage, the bill, known as HR 4820, died in
committee in the Senate. If passed, HR 4820 would have required the Department of
Homeland Security to utilize the testimonials of former radicals in foreign terrorist
organizations, such as the videos of former jihadists in the “Think Again Turn Away”
campaign who said that extremism is morally wrong. Fleischmann hoped that the
testimonials would help potential ISIS recruits understand that life in the caliphate is not
desirable (Daly, 2016). State Department officials, however, already use testimonials in
their campaign without a law requiring the department to do so. If the bill became law, it
would likely not benefit national security in the way Fleischmann hoped. Terrorist
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testimonials in the State Department campaign did not reap the outcome that federal
officials desired, and requiring another federal agency to begin a similar project would
likely also be ineffective.
Two senators pushed another congressional attempt at fighting ISIS online in
2015. Senator Richard Burr, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Senator
Dianne Feinstein, a ranking member of the committee, sponsored a bill called “Requiring
Reporting of Online Terrorist Activity Act.” The bill required social media websites, and
some other technology companies, to alert law enforcement of “any terrorist activity”
(Nasr, 2015). The bill came in response to the shootings in San Bernardino, California,
which is Senator Feinstein’s home state. She emphasized that the bill would not require
companies to change how they monitor criminal activity on their websites. Instead, it
simply requires them to report terrorist activity when they find such information (Nasr,
2015).
Senator Ron Wyden opposed the bill by saying, “I believe it will undermine
[collaboration between the government and private companies] and lead to less reporting
of terrorist activity, not more” (Nasr, 2015). Each technology company is able to monitor
its website however it chooses. Although Senator Feinstein claimed that there would be
no extra obligations on companies except reporting terrorist activity, many companies
could see the reporting as tedious because they would have to then participate in an
investigation, possibly answer questions from law enforcement, and many other logistical
requirements. Wyden suggested that, in order to avoid tedious collaboration with law
enforcement, some companies may simply lower monitoring standards so they will not
find as much terrorist activity (Nasr, 2015).
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Additionally, Wyden made two other points against the legislation. The senator
noted that FBI Director James Comey did not endorse the legislation proposal when
Feinstein asked him about it at a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on July 8, 2015.
When asked about the bill, Comey responded, “It’s an interesting idea. I do find in
practice that they are pretty good about telling us what they see” (Nasr, 2015). Comey’s
response seemed to suggest that the bill is unnecessary since technology companies are
already adequately reporting terrorist activity.
Wyden’s other point countered an argument many people made in support of the
bill. Supporters argued that technology companies already must report child pornography
if it appears on their websites, and many people do not see a difference in mandating the
reporting of terrorist activity. When a reporter for Oregon Public Broadcasting asked
Wyden about the argument, the senator replied, “First of all, I think that there are
different standards with respect to child pornography, different standards under the law”
(Norcross, 2015).
Despite Wyden’s vague answer, his point is valid. As discussed earlier in this
paper, the First Amendment does not protect against actions that pose a clear and present
danger. For example, if a jihadist posted on the Facebook wall of another asking for the
assistance of killing a police officer at a certain place and time the next day, the first
jihadist would be breaking the law. Facebook could then simply shut down the account
and inform the police department if the company so chooses. Although the illegal plan
occurred on Facebook, the illegal end result of killing the officer did not. On the other
hand, if a man posted child pornography on another man’s Facebook wall, the social
media company would shut down the account, and the law mandates that Facebook must
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inform law enforcement of the pornography. In this situation, the pornography was the
illegal end result. The pornography would not be a stepping-stone for another more
heinous crime. If the man, instead, made a Facebook post about his possession of child
pornography, the website could delete the account and choose whether or not to alert the
proper law enforcement agency.
Burr and Feinstein introduced the bill amid extreme criticism from numerous civil
liberties advocates. Ultimately, the Legislative Branch did not enact the measure by the
end of the 114th Congress. The Congress, therefore, cleared the legislation from the books
(“S. 2372,” 2015). Although the legislation failed, it began conversations that can be
utilized in future legislation used to combat ISIS on social media.
Senator Wyden’s criticisms of the bill were legitimate, but his alternative
legislation idea is also flawed. Wyden desires to introduce legislation to give intelligence
agencies “more resources and personnel so they know where to look for terrorist content
online and who to watch, and can ensure terrorist activity is quickly reported and acted
upon” (Nasr, 2015). One of the main issues with Wyden’s legislation idea is that each
intelligence agency already has the opportunity to request Congress to increase funding
for resources and personnel. A blanket increase in resources and personnel for the
intelligence agencies that actively fight ISIS online may be unnecessary and ineffective.
Representative Ted Poe approached the problem differently, sponsoring the
Combat Terrorist Use of Social Media Act of 2015, HR 3654. Poe’s legislation simply
required the Executive Branch to provide a plan to necessary congressional committees to
fight the presence of terrorists on social media in no more than 90 days. The bill,
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however, failed in the 114th Congress because while it passed the House, the Senate took
no action (“H.R. 3654,” 2015).
If enacted, the legislation would have forced the Executive Branch to work with
the intelligence community and congressional committees to inform necessary parties of
the dangers of terrorist use of social media, summarize the multi-agency approach to
fighting terrorism online, and explain future plans to disrupt online radicalization efforts.
The bill would also require the report to be unclassified, which would undermine the
usefulness of the legislation (“H.R. 3654,” 2015).
Some current and future plans to fight ISIS may likely be confidential due to the
sensitivity of the information. If Representative Poe did not include the language about
mandating the report to be unclassified, or if other lawmakers amended the legislation,
the president would be required to report a detailed and confidential plan to congressional
committee members who hold security clearances. An unclassified report, however,
would undermine the value of the legislation. The current Congress has the opportunity to
write legislation that mirrors Poe’s bill that would require President Trump to provide a
plan to fight social media terrorism, but the language about the unclassified report should
be removed.
Military action, however, has been effective in combating the Islamic State, and
some of the tangible results of military efforts could directly affect ISIS presence on
social media. Russian and Western attacks destroyed many of the ISIS-controlled oil
fields throughout the Middle East while Kurdish and Iraqi ground troop advances forced
ISIS militants from functional oil fields. When ISIS militants retreated from those
formerly held areas, they also left behind many of the people in those regions. Since ISIS
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receives much of its money from oil fields and taxing people within regions it controls,
militarily overtaking ISIS-controlled areas financially hinders the terrorist group. Mosul,
for instance, is the final significant ISIS stronghold in Iraq, and residents of the city
reported that ISIS can no longer pay the thousands of fighters that remain in the city
(Gutteridge, 2017).
Due to the lack of funds, ISIS must cut the budget in many different areas.
Required cutbacks mean the group will likely not be able to pay its recruiters nearly as
much as in the past. Fewer recruiters and less resources to recruit could hinder the
recruitment process. Additionally, ISIS will not have funds to pay film editors or
purchase equipment for high quality propaganda videos.
Some ISIS fighters in Mosul, for instance, have already proven that they are
willing to disobey commands in order to be paid. ISIS commanders ordered fighters in
Mosul to use civilians as human shields during the war. However, some ISIS soldiers
reportedly smuggled out families in exchange for money. Sometimes the payment is as
little as £15 (Gutteridge, 2017). As the Islamic State loses funding to pay its social media
and recruitment employees, they are also suffering defeats that could frighten otherwise
susceptible audiences.
United States agencies utilize the misfortunes of ISIS to add to the success of the
Global Engagement Center (GEC). The GEC serves as an interagency body with the
mission to counter extremist propaganda online. Although the State Department houses
the GEC, numerous government agencies, including the intelligence community,
contribute funding and personnel to the program. Additionally, the head of GEC has
authority to hire nongovernmental experts. Some experts, for example, can inform GEC
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of the ISIS financial situation while other experts can recruit ISIS defectors to tell their
stories. Former GEC director Michael Lumpkin claimed that although the agency is
receiving success due to its interagency approach, it is facing setbacks due to the
regulations of each agency. Lumpkin said, “Each department has got its own rules and
regulations and review procedures, and we just need to work through. It’s not that it’s not
working, it’s just frankly, it’ll take some time to work through the process” (Wong,
2016). Representative Brad Sherman of California stated, for example, that the State
Department must clear a tweet through 14 levels of review before it can be posted and
tweets from State Department funded entities must clear six levels of review. Such
regulations can severely hinder the GEC social media campaign (Wong, 2016).
President Trump, however, seeks to reduce such regulations. On February 24,
2017, the president signed an executive order that requires each federal agency to develop
a task force that will identify regulations that may need to be reduced or removed. The
president stated, “Every regulation should have to pass a simple test. Does it make life
better or safer for American worker or consumers? If the answer is no, we will be getting
rid of it – and getting rid of it quickly” (Horsley, 2017). If the State Department and other
agencies deem that their social media regulations are hindering the GEC from effectively
combating ISIS propaganda, such regulations could be reduced or removed. ISISsympathetic social media accounts make numerous posts every day. If the United States
has too many regulations for the GEC to make a significant amount of posts, the program
may not be as successful as it would be without the regulations.
Another government tactic that directly influences social media is the FBI
undercover sting operation. The FBI utilizes undercover operations in approximately two
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thirds of prosecutions of people convicted of supporting ISIS, which used to only be a
practice used only when no other option seemed feasible. FBI officials stated that the
anonymity of social media websites, like when ISIS-sympathizers utilize alias usernames
in order to give support for the terrorist group, caused the uptick in undercover stings.
According to The New York Times, the FBI increased its use of undercover sting
operations in 2016, and it employs “agents and informants to pose as jihadists, bomb
makers, gun dealers or online ‘friends’ in hundreds of investigations into Americans
suspected of supporting the Islamic State” (Lichtblau, 2016). FBI agents often comb
through social media websites to look for people who support ISIS or threaten acts of
terrorism. Once someone is deemed as a threat, an undercover agent will contact the
person (Lichtblau, 2016).
In order for the FBI to build a strong case against suspects, undercover agents
nationwide aided suspects in activities such as locating bomb targets and buying
weapons. These actions earn the trust of the suspect and allow the FBI to track terror
plots. Michael Steinbach, leader of the FBI national security branch, said, “We’re not
going to wait for the person to mobilize on his own time line” (Lichtblau, 2016).
Since counterterrorism officials claim that ISIS calls its followers to attack people
who disagree with the caliphate just days or weeks after the followers’ radicalization, the
FBI also use undercover operations to quickly track and foil terrorist plots. If the FBI
utilized practices such as wiretapping, for example, it would need wait for a judge to sign
a warrant. Additionally, if the judge did not sign the warrant, the FBI would need to
begin a new plan. Undercover operations, however, are under the authority of a team of
FBI supervisors and Department of Justice prosecutors. For that reason, stings can

Howell 50
usually begin much more quickly than operations that require a warrant (Lichtblau,
2016).
Critics of the practices, however, claim that the FBI is still illegally entrapping
suspects. Some Muslim leaders, defense attorneys, civil rights advocates, and others
argue that the FBI contacts susceptible people and coerce them into making statements or
performing actions that may not have happened without the coaxing. Michael German, a
former undercover agent, agreed, claiming that the FBI is “manufacturing terrorism
cases” because, out of the suspects in recent prosecutions, “these people are five steps
away from being a danger to the United States” (Lichtblau, 2016).
In an attempt to curb criticism and build a legal case against suspects, FBI
officials explained that they followed the agency’s internal guidelines to use the least
intrusive possible methods. Besides the anonymity of social media, the officials claimed
that the use of encrypted messaging by ISIS-sympathizers caused a need for undercover
operations. Additionally, undercover agents often give suspects an opportunity to back
out of a terror plot. An example of a suspect who received an opportunity to leave the
situation is James Medina of Miami. Medina told an undercover agent, who posed as a
bomb supplier, that he wanted to bomb a synagogue. In response, the agent spoke to
Medina about his reasoning for wanting to bomb the synagogue, and then the agent said,
“You need to be sure, brother. You know you don’t have to do any of this” (Lichtblau,
2016). Medina confirmed his dedication, he received a fake bomb, and then the FBI
arrested him as he approached the synagogue. Due to the processes that the FBI follows,
no judge has deemed the undercover practices as entrapment (Lichtblau, 2016).
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The FBI also utilizes resources and personnel to identify and kill ISIS hackers.
The FBI identified approximately twelve ISIS computer experts, known as “the Legion”
(Goldman and Schmitt, 2016) that pose a serious threat to national security. Junaid
Hussain, who died in a drone attack, helped hack a computer system and release the
personal information of more than 1,300 American government employees. “In March
2015, his group posted the names and addresses of service members with instructions:
‘Kill them in their own lands, behead them in their own homes, stab them to death as they
walk their streets thinking they are safe’” (Goldman and Schmitt, 2016). FBI officials
convinced the federal government that law enforcement should not combat the Legion
alone. In 2016, FBI officials increased monitoring of ISIS suspects throughout the United
States while military overseas shifted focus specifically to members of Legion. The
military killed some members of the group, which decreases the likely amount of hacking
that will take place in the immediate future (Goldman and Schmitt, 2016). Continued
military efforts against the Legion and similar hackers will decrease the amount of
substantive material that can be found on pro-ISIS social media accounts. For instance, if
ISIS Twitter accounts no longer posted lists of the addresses of federal employees, fewer
officials will be specifically targeted due to their positions within the government. In
addition to the military strikes against the Legion, the Department of Defense (DOD) also
destroyed many overseas facilities that ISIS used to produce propaganda videos and
messages that the group posts online. Military efforts continually weaken ISIS social
media campaigns while the DOD also fights the terrorist group online (Parrish, 2016).
As the Defense Department continued to directly combat ISIS overseas in 2016,
the department also limited its cyberwarfare tactics against the group due to concerns
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within the intelligence community. The main concern came from the possibility that
blocking the Islamic State’s internet connection could hinder intelligence gathering from
the group (Associated Press, 2016). Even if the military did block all internet connection
from certain ISIS strongholds, it would not end the social media problem. Since
Westerners control many of the pro-ISIS social media pages, propaganda and recruitment
could continue throughout the world even without internet in ISIS strongholds. The
number of Western pro-ISIS social media recruiters, however, will likely decrease due to
the aforementioned lack of funding.
Another reason to not completely disrupt the internet connections in ISIS
strongholds, according to a cybersecurity expert named James Lewis, is that is could
negatively affect civilian internet networks in those areas for those trying to inform news
media of the situation, contact family members, etc. Furthermore, disrupting internet
connections through targeted bombings could put citizens in even more danger
(Associated Press, 2016). Due to the negative externalities, military personnel may find
more success in fighting online recruitment and propaganda through other means.
Two other means the DOD utilizes in the fight against ISIS on the internet are the
Digital Engagement Team (DET) and web operations cell. Some of the eleven members
of the DET are native-born Russian, Dari, Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, and/or Urdu speakers.
Members of the team represent the DOD in countries that speak their native language in
news media and online. The DET helps disseminate anti-ISIS messages from opposing
forces in different countries (Parrish, 2016).
The web operations cell disrupts ISIS propaganda, displays defector testimonies,
and mobilizes ISIS opponents. In order to disrupt propaganda, the web operations cell
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ensures the consistency of anti-ISIS messages of the DET, State Department, and other
government entities. The 120 person web operations cell team also researches ISIS
morale and propaganda techniques. An unnamed web operations official told Department
of Defense News that the ISIS presence on social media changed in 2014. The source
stated,
“In 2014, when ISIL took Mosul, they maintained a dozen official [social media]
accounts that said ‘We are ISIL.’ They also relied on several dozen ‘fanboy’
accounts which could boast upwards of 100,000 followers. So in terms of official
messaging and in terms of unofficial support messaging, ISIL could quickly and
easily reach hundreds of thousands of supporters and really the whole world with
minimal effort. But since 2014, a combination of aggressive suspensions from
social media companies, attrition and decrease in morale in ISIL’s own ranks –
which we’ve seen play out and we’ve seen them express this; that there’s a loss in
morale – and the third element would be counter-efforts from both governmental
and nongovernmental entities. A combination of those three has gradually
degraded ISIL’s footprint, ISIL’s ability to quickly and easily reach the masses”
(Parrish, 2016).
In order to add to the degradation of ISIS social media presence, the web
operations cell utilizes testimonies of defectors, similar to the State Department’s “Think
Again Turn Away” campaign. Unlike the largely ineffective State Department program,
however, the testimonies focus less on the morality of ISIS and more on the
trustworthiness of the group. Out of the defectors who speak to the web operations cell,
for instance, the main reason they leave ISIS is because the terrorist group lied about who
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recruits would fight against. ISIS members told many recruits that they would be fighting
the Syrian regime when they joined the terrorist group, but instead they would often fight
against other rebel groups in the region. Additionally, defectors complained that ISIS
media fabricated numerous aspects of the terrorist group such as its popularity in the
region and the amount of food that fighters received (Parrish, 2016).
In order to mobilize ISIS opponents in different regions, the web operations cell
gives factual information, such as who ISIS fighters will actually be fighting, to anti-ISIS
rebel groups on Twitter. The rebel groups and the web operations cell can use the
information to dissuade potential recruits from joining ISIS (Parrish, 2016). By utilizing a
three-pronged web operations cell, the DET, and physical military missions, the DOD
attempts to actively decrease the ISIS social media presence. Recent reporting from the
Associated Press (AP), however, suggests that the web operations program is highly
flawed in multiple respects.
An AP investigation gathered testimonies from former and current employees of
the web operations cell that revealed details of many of the flaws. One of the serious
issues within the program is that the DOD hired multiple people as civilian Arabic
specialists who did not speak fluent Arabic. The AP report states that many of the
specialists could not speak Arabic fluently, did not hold counterterrorism experience, and
had very little comprehension of Islam. These shortcomings hurt DOD efforts to
deradicalize potential recruits since the specialists could not compete with the knowledge
of ISIS recruiters. Some of the mistakes are so egregious that pro-ISIS accounts would
identify and ridicule American efforts. One example of a common mistake by translators
working for the DOD is that they repeatedly confused the phonetically similar Arabic

Howell 55
words for “authority” and “salad.” The mistake led pro-ISIS social media accounts to
mock the United States by making posts referring to “Palestinian salad” (Butler and
Lardner, January 31, 2017).
Additionally, four current or former employees claimed that they personally
witnessed web operations manipulate data in order for the program to appear more
successful than it actually is. Employees reportedly attempted to implement independent
investigators to oversee or assess data, but the DOD has yet to enforce such measures.
Multiple contractors work to provide the data, and the web operations cell faced other
issues with contractors in 2016 (Butler and Lardner, January 31, 2017).
In early 2016, the government held a bidding war for a counterpropaganda
contract worth up to $500 million that would help the web operations cell in its
counterterrorism efforts. After the DOD awarded the contract, the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS) spokesman Ed Buice announced to the AP that an
investigation launched after a whistleblower alleged corruption in the decision of the
contractor. The whistleblower claimed different types of corruption occurred
simultaneously. For example, the whistleblower alleged that a contractor provided lavish
dinners to officials who would provide the contract, and officials participated in routine
alcohol consumption within an office where the DOD participated in classified projects.
(Butler and Lardner, January 31, 2017).
Whether or not corruption took place, the web operations cell is still fraught with
issues. Despite the problems within the web operations cell, the mission and multifaceted approach of the program could be beneficial if the government enforces proper
oversight. President Trump promised an increase in military spending over the course of
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his presidency (Butler and Lardner, January 31, 2017). Increases in spending could
improve the web operations cell in multiple ways. If Arabic specialists, for example,
receive better compensation, then the job would be more competitive. Increased
competition could lead to better employees who know more about the Arabic language
and culture. Additionally, the DOD could improve standards for their Arabic specialist
prospects, such as multiple language fluency tests.
Multiple investigations from different branches of government, such as the NCIS
and congressional investigations, allow government officials of different levels of
experience and expertise to curb issues within problematic federal programs. Unlike
“Think Again Turn Away,” the web operations cell may be highly effective if the DOD
hires better leadership and language specialists to seek the original goal of the program.
Due to the program’s multi-faceted approach and connection to other counterterrorism
programs within the DOD, it is highly probable that the web operations cell could be
successful if the military removes the project’s shortcomings.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
ISIS has an organized approach to propaganda dissemination, radicalization, and
recruitment that is unprecedented by other terrorist organizations. The group’s
international approach from multiple social media accounts serves as a serious challenge
to the intelligence community.
When seeking a target audience, ISIS may focus on tribalism, such as Sunni
versus Shiite or Arabs versus non-Arabs, in order to radicalize those who are most
susceptible. Although ISIS recruiters are very talented in utilizing different tactics to
radicalize different types of people, I assess that the lack of funding for recruiters and the
actions of social media companies to remove ISIS-related accounts will continue to
hinder the recruitment process.
Both public and private organizations have proven to be effective in meeting the
challenge of radicalization and recruitment. Private social media and search engine
companies implemented measures that successfully suspend pro-ISIS accounts quicker
than they can be created and deradicalize potential recruits by rerouting internet searches
to anti-ISIS materials. The companies should, however, limit the amount of information
about their anti-ISIS strategies that they release to the public.
Governmental efforts have experienced numerous flaws, but they have been
mainly successful. The federal government should continue to work with private
companies to share strategies and information that assist both sectors in the fight against
ISIS. In addition, the federal government should continue sharing tools with the private
sector without forcing companies to use said tools. Although staying within the bounds of
the United States Constitution will likely hinder America from catching every terrorist
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who uses the internet, it also allows the government to respect the freedoms of the people
it serves.
Intelligence agencies, with the help of the military, continue to successfully arrest
and fight ISIS on social media in multiple ways. The web operations cell, however, must
raise standards for leadership and language specialist in order to effectively combat ISIS
by hiring highly qualified employees. If military intelligence programs fight social media
online as the military fights them on the ground, the terrorist group will continue to
weaken.
Although some efforts have either shown to be ineffective or flawed, the pressure
on ISIS from American companies and the federal government has been largely
successful in fighting radicalization efforts, incarcerating extremists, shutting down
violent social media accounts, and defeating the terrorist group in physical battles.
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